![]() ![]() I argue that while western states like the UK rightly recognise problems of uncertainty and 'non-linearity' in international life, they also show too much confidence in their capacity to anticipate and prevent problems 'upstream', thus implicitly exempting themselves from the chaos they see in the external environment. My forthcoming article in the European Journal of International Security, 2016. Whether or not Strategy for Chaos improves the score for joint endeavour readers must judge for themselves. An unsurprising result of these parallel déformations professionelles is that the literature of the RMA debate contains some conceptually intriguing social science, and quite solid beginnings in historical study, but the twain scarcely meet and hardly ever in the same piece of work. ![]() For their part, historians typically are far better at writing narrative and analysing unique happenings than they are at genuinely comparative scholarship. Inevitably, social scientists tend to be relatively weak when they boldly go into the zone of historical case studies. Social scientists and the theories they invent betray the reverse tendency: no less characteristically they reveal a rush, historians would say a premature rush, to find more general meaning in particular behaviours. As the text below comments at suitable junctures, historians and the history they discover characteristically reveal a pull to singularisation, towards seeing events as being unique both in themselves and in context. One of the purposes of this new book series is to encourage the publication of studies which make an honest and tolerably successful effort to achieve synergy between the two broad disciplines. Quite aside from the problem of contributors who have barely hidden service or industrial interests colouring their arguments, even scholars notably competent as theorydeveloping social scientists or as archival historians are apt to underperform when they wander off their usual patch. The recent American RMA debate generated much more noise than illumination. A polity requires such professionalism, as Germany demonstrated negatively and repeatedly, but it requires also that the professionals charged with the making of policy and strategy should be educated in relevant historical contexts. Meanwhile, seriously misleading beliefs of a social scientific, technological, and historical kind are commonplace among officials and politicians whose professionalism centres around manipulation of a policy process. Social-scientific errors are committed by historians, while historical howlers abound in briefings by social scientists and technocrats. The debate over revolutions in military affairs (RMAs), the Big American Defence Debate of the 1990s, amply rewards the collector of errors. Social scientists and historians are wont to compete energetically to demonstrate to each other that they are to be trusted neither when playing at home in their supposedly professional field, nor, far less, when they play away on the road on the other field of dreams. To that end, the work treats its duty to theory building and to respect for historical data with equal gravity and, sometimes, scepticism. This book employs the kind of theory meaningful to a social scientist trying to render historical data an evidential base to advance understanding cumulatively. This new series on ‘Strategy and History’. ![]()
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